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BACKLASH BLUNDERS: OBERGEFELL AND THE EFFICACY OF
LITIGATION TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE
Adam Deming∗
INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2015, exactly two years after it invalidated key portions of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) in United States v.
Windsor, the Supreme Court issued its historic 5-4 ruling in Obergefell
v. Hodges, holding that same-sex couples could no longer be barred
1
from exercising the fundamental right to marriage. For marriageequality supporters, this judicial victory represented “the culmination
2
of decades of litigation and activism.” The gathering outside of the
Supreme Court at the time of the ruling exuded an attitude of jubilation that spread throughout the country, as same-sex couples gathered in various cities to publicly celebrate the decision and, in many
3
cases, to exercise their newly protected right to marry. Supporters of
the Supreme Court’s holding also took to social media, as twenty-six
∗
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Class of 2017, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I would like to extend my deepest
thanks to Professor Sophia Lee, whose seminar inspired me to write this Comment, and
whose guidance was indispensable throughout the writing process. I am also grateful to
the Journal of Constitutional Law Editors and Board for their thorough editing. Finally,
special thanks to Christopher Clark, Harry Black, Mary Kramolowsky, David Deming, and
Molly Daffner, who kindly provided feedback, support, and constant encouragement
throughout the evolution of this Comment.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Makes Same-Sex Marriage a Right Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES
(June 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/supreme-court-same-sexmarriage.html?_r=0.
Id. (collecting photos of “supporters of same-sex marriage gathered outside the Supreme
Court”); Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Rules Gay Couples Nationwide Have a Right to Marry,
WASH. POST (June 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/gay-marriageand-other-major-rulings-at-the-supreme-court/2015/06/25/ef75a120-1b6d-11e5-bd7f4611a60dd8e5_story.html (“A sea of cheering, rainbow flag-waving people filled the sidewalk in front of the Supreme Court to celebrate the decision.”); Supreme Court Rules on
Gay Marriage—Highlights, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/live/
supreme-court-rulings/?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=a-lede-packageregion&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news (reporting on reactions to the decision
around the country).
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million Facebook users applied the now famous rainbow filter to
their profile pictures, while over six million tweets, including a widely
circulated one from President Barack Obama, used the hashtag
4
“#lovewins” to show support for the decision.
The tenor of public discourse regarding the ruling was not entirely celebratory, however. Some who opposed the outcome feared for
their religious freedoms, and a few states even delayed the issuance of
5
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Several commentators on
both sides of the aisle also gave less than optimistic forecasts for the
decision’s impact, warning of the impending social and political
6
backlash that was sure to follow. Explanations for this imminent
backlash differed: while some openly drew comparisons to the negative public reactions that followed past important divisive cases, such
7
as Roe v. Wade and Brown v. Board of Education, others more simply attributed the approaching wave of backlash to frustration over the
Court’s lack of democratic legitimacy compared to the other branch-

4

5

6

7

Heather Kelly, Facebook Rainbow Profiles Used by 26 Million, CNN: MONEY (June 30, 2015),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/29/technology/facebook-rainbow-profile/ (“Rainbows
spread quickly all over Facebook this weekend to celebrate the Supreme Court decision
that legalized same-sex marriage.”); Kerry Flynn, How #LoveWins on Twitter Became the Most
Viral Hashtag of the Same-Sex Marriage Ruling, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 26, 2015),
http://www.ibtimes.com/how-lovewins-twitter-became-most-viral-hashtag-same-sexmarriage-ruling-1986279 (describing the meteoric rise in popularity of the “#loveWins”
hashtag after President Obama used it on Twitter).
Elliot C. McLaughlin, Despite Same-Sex Marriage Ruling, Spasms of Resistance Persist, CNN
(June 30, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/30/us/same-sex-marriage-supremecourt-ruling-holdouts/ (quoting governmental officials who opposed the decision and
describing how state governments in Alabama and Louisiana initially delayed enforcement of the Court’s ruling).
See, e.g., John Culhane, The Gay Marriage Fight Isn’t Over, POLITICO (June 26, 2015),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/06/gay-marriage-legal-backlash-119468
(“[This] decision will supply a hefty dose of oxygen to efforts already underway in red
state legislatures to continue to deny marriage rights to gay couples.”); Scott Wyant, Let
the Backlash Begin, DAILY KOS (July 5, 2015), http://www.dailykos.com/story/
2015/7/5/1399416/-Let-the-Backlash-Begin (outlining the Arkansas government’s resistance to the ruling, including statements from members of the state legislature, and
opining that this represents the beginning of a long period of backlash).
See, e.g., Culhane, supra note 6 (“In some ways, this new chapter of the gay marriage fight
will likely mirror abortion rights in the wake of Roe v. Wade—a right technically legal but
frustratingly difficult to exercise in many corners of the country.”); Michael C. Dorf, Will
the Supreme Court’s Same-Sex Marriage Ruling Face “Massive Resistance”?, JUSTIA VERDICT
(June 30, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/06/30/will-the-supreme-courts-samesex-marriage-ruling-face-massive-resistance (“Segregationists in the South (joined by some
in the North) responded to Brown with a campaign of ‘massive resistance’. . . . [I]t is easy
to imagine a campaign of, if not massive resistance, then at least substantial resistance to
the Court’s [same-sex marriage] ruling.”).
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8

es. Notables among this latter group included the dissenting Justices, who uniformly decried the majority’s decision as a usurpation of
9
the legislature’s role in democratic governance. Chief Justice John
G. Roberts, Jr., stressed this theme early in his dissent, stating: “Five
lawyers have closed the debate and enacted their own vision of marriage as a matter of constitutional law. Stealing this issue from the
people will for many cast a cloud over same-sex marriage, making a
10
dramatic social change that much more difficult to accept.”
Despite gloomy forecasts and initial rumblings of red state resistance, any hints of outright defiance quickly fizzled. In multiple
states where the decision struck down existing marriage laws, Republican officeholders nevertheless issued public statements of intent to
comply with the Supreme Court’s ruling, despite expressing personal
11
disagreement with the Court’s holding. Contrary to earlier statements threatening to postpone the issuance of marriage licenses, by
June 29, 2015, a mere three days after the ruling, every state was issuing marriage licenses in compliance with the Supreme Court’s deci12
sion.
With the notable exception of one defiant county clerk capturing
13
media attention, the country quickly adjusted to a new mode of
business as usual—one where states willingly granted marriage licenses to the couples who sought them, regardless of sex. All but the decision’s most persistent detractors fell out of the spotlight relatively
quickly, and public opinion in favor of same-sex marriage remained

8
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See David Post, A Few Words on Obergefell and the Countermajoritarian Tendency, WASH.
POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/29/a-few-words-on-obergefell-and-thecountermajoritarian-tendency/ (arguing that the Obergefell decision “will come back to
bite us” because it effectively excludes opponents of gay marriage from the political process and delegitimizes their world view).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611–26, 2626–31, 2631–40, 2640–43 (2015) (Roberts, C.J. & Scalia, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting separately).
Id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
McLaughlin, supra note 5 (“Most states where same-sex marriage was outlawed before
Friday . . . saw their governors or attorneys general promise to abide by the ruling, though
many made it clear they didn’t care for it.”).
Jacob Koffler, The Last Holdout Has Now Issued Gay Marriage Licenses, TIME (June 29, 2015),
http://time.com/3940330/gay-marriage-louisiana/ (“The last state holding out on issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples after Friday’s historic Supreme Court ruling has
relented.”).
See Alan Blinder & Tamar Lewin, Clerk in Kentucky Chooses Jail Over Deal on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/kim-davissame-sex-marriage.html?_r=0 (reporting on Kim Davis, a county clerk in Kentucky who
was jailed after “defying a federal court order to issue licenses to gay couples”).
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14

stable. This seemingly smooth transition raises the question: where
is the backlash? If this decision is comparable to Roe and Brown, why
aren’t protestors gathered outside of the county clerks’ offices where
marriage licenses are issued, and where is the “Traditional Marriage
15
Manifesto?”
The simple answer is that the Obergefell decision has not caused
and will not incite a major backlash. This Comment will explore several of the reasons why the predicted backlash will never come to fruition. Part I will briefly recount the history of litigation leading up to
Obergefell, describing how the unique road that led to the decision
had the effect of reducing future resistance to it. Part II will discuss
some of the most prominent backlash frameworks and how backlash
scholars have applied them to the struggle for same-sex marriage.
Part III will use strands of the backlash literature to argue that Obergefell is not a cause for alarm among those anxiously anticipating massive resistance. Finally, Part IV will use Obergefell to challenge the conventional wisdom that courts are extremely limited in their capacity
to serve as an effective vehicle for significant social change.
Though this paper aims toward inspiring a critical reexamination
of some of the backlash literature, it also acknowledges the role that
awareness of the phenomenon of backlash has played, motivating institutional learning and adaptation on the part of both litigators and
courts that made the advances heralded by Obergefell possible. I hope
to show that, because of the Supreme Court’s institutional learning
and the unique political accountability structure surrounding the judicial branch as compared to the other branches, the decision to pursue social change in the Court is, at the very least, no less defensible
than attempting to do so through the legislature. In certain situa-

14

15

David Boaz, Marriage’s Lonely Warrior, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 11, 2015),
http://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2015/09/11/kim-davis-is-just-a-lonelygay-marriage-warrior (“Kim Davis is not a symbol of massive resistance. Mostly she’s just a
lonely warrior.”); Justin McCarthy, U.S. Support for Gay Marriage Stable After High Court Ruling, GALLUP (July 17, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/184217/support-gay-marriagestable-high-court-ruling.aspx?g_source=SAME_SEX_RELATIONS&g_medium=topic&g_
campaign=tiles (explaining that the Court’s ruling on same-sex marriage “has not affected the way Americans feel about the issue”).
But see Statement Calling for Constitutional Resistance to Obergefell v. Hodges, AMERICAN
PRINCIPLES PROJECT (Oct. 8, 2015), https://americanprinciplesproject.org/foundingprinciples/statement-calling-for-constitutional-resistance-to-obergefell-vhodges%E2%80%AF/ (resisting the Court’s Obergefell opinion and calling on federal and
state officials “to refuse to accept Obergefell as binding precedent”). Unlike the Southern
Manifesto, however, this seems to have generated relatively little mainstream attention or
support.
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tions, the Court will be a more efficient vehicle for such change.
Obergefell may very well provide an example of one such scenario.
I. THE ROAD TO OBERGEFELL
While the initial rumblings of the litigation battle over same-sex
marriage began in the 1970s, resulting in a string of unsuccessful law16
suits, the movement started to gain real traction in 1993 with the
first same-sex marriage victory in a court of last resort anywhere in
17
the United States. In the case of Baehr v. Lewin, the Hawaii Supreme
Court declared that withholding the right of marriage from same-sex
couples constituted sex discrimination and thus presumptively violat18
ed the Hawaii Constitution. This historic ruling converted the idea
of same-sex marriage from a distant ambition to a reality—surprising
19
and, ultimately, mobilizing those on both sides of the controversy.
While the mobilization effect of Baehr among those opposed to samesex marriage was obvious, as they rapidly (and successfully) moved to
quell the ruling via legislation in Hawaii and launch legislative cam20
paigns in a number of other states, the mobilizing effects were at
first more diffuse for marriage-equality advocates. Though solid data
are unavailable, some assert that, by rendering same-sex marriage realistic, Baehr had a unifying effect on the agenda of the gay rights
movement, transforming this now attainable end into a uniform
21
goal. Others argue that any agenda-setting effect largely arose as the
16

17
18

19
20
21

See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1102,
1111 (1982) (affirming refusal to issue marriage license to same-sex couple applicants);
Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d
588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
801, 810 (1972); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (denying that
common law marriage applied to same-sex unions); Singer v. Hara, 552 P.2d 1187 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1974) (affirming refusal to grant marriage license to same-sex applicants). Daniel Pinello notes that one major reason these cases were unsuccessful was because they
were brought by “[l]one couples, unsupported by organized lesbian and gay interests,
[who] made ad hoc assertions of novel social and constitutional positions, often without
the benefit of legal arguments orchestrated by seasoned advocates.” DANIEL R. PINELLO,
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 23 (2006).
PINELLO, supra note 16, at 25.
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 54, 67–68 (Haw. 1993) (holding that a state marriage law,
insofar as it was used to ban same-sex marriage, violated the state constitution’s Equal
Protection Clause, and was thus presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny upon remand).
PINELLO, supra note 16, at 25–30.
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 63–66, 68 (2013).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Backlash Politics: How Constitutional Litigation Has Advanced Marriage Equality in the United States, 93 B.U. L. REV. 275, 311–12 (2013).
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result of the same-sex marriage movement necessarily taking a defensive posture in response to the massive “anticipatory countermobiliza22
tion” that the Baehr decision incited across various states.
Either way, opponents of same-sex marriage struck first, and they
struck hard. A state constitutional amendment overturned the Ha23
waii ruling before any same-sex marriages could occur. Likewise,
just three years after Baehr, in 1996, Congress passed DOMA, defining
marriage as being between “one man and one woman,” removing the
possibility of federal benefits for same-sex couples, and authorizing
states to withhold recognition of same-sex marriages executed in oth24
er states. Over the course of the subsequent ten years, legislative
campaigns across the United States would result in more than forty
different states banning same-sex marriage via legislation or state
25
constitutional amendment.
In 1999, the next major state ruling in favor of same-sex marriage
emerged in Vermont. Baker v. State determined that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the state constitution’s equal
26
protection provision. The Vermont Supreme Court delegated the
creation of a remedy to the legislature, which found that civil unions
would satisfy the state’s constitutional requirements, passing a bill
27
that brought them into effect the following year.
Though one
prominent backlash scholar has characterized Baker as an ideal political compromise, embodying “the values of tolerance and mutual re28
spect” in an otherwise gridlocked political environment, neither side
seemed satisfied with the outcome. Opponents of same-sex marriage
repeatedly attempted to repeal the civil union legislation, while many
marriage-equality advocates would soon see the civil union label as a

22
23

24

25
26
27
28

Michael C. Dorf & Sidney Tarrow, Strange Bedfellows: How an Anticipatory Countermovement
Brought Same-Sex Marriage into the Public Arena, 39 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 449, 455, 461 (2014).
PINELLO, supra note 16, at 27. It is worth noting, however, that “in the wake of Baehr, the
state legislature in 1997 created a ‘reciprocal benefits’ law that granted limited relationship rights to same-sex couples.” Id.
1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996) (defining “marriage” as “a legal union between one man and one
woman), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013); 28 U.S.C. §
1738C (1996) (allowing states to deny giving effect to the same-sex marriages of other
states in their own jurisdictions). Collectivley, these statutes comprise the Defense of
Marriage Act. See also PINELLO, supra note 16, at 29.
PINELLO, supra note 16, at 29.
744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
PINELLO, supra note 16, at 29–30.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil Unions, 64 ALB. L. REV. 853, 881 (2001).
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form of “second-class citizenship,” despite the admitted progress that
29
it embodied.
In 2003, the United States Supreme Court began to seriously
weigh in on the debate with its landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas. In a previous case, Romer v. Evans, the Court had condemned the
“animosity” underlying a Colorado statute that foreclosed the possi30
bility of statutory protections based on sexual orientation. Echoing
Romer, the Lawrence opinion held that moral disapproval was insufficient to justify the criminalization of homosexual activity, overturning
31
its precedent from Bowers v. Hardwick. Though Justice Kennedy,
who wrote the opinion, made it clear that the ruling had no effect on
32
same-sex marriage rights, commentators noted that “he left little
33
doubt where his (and the Court’s) sympathies lay.” Justice Scalia also expressed incredulity regarding the self-imposed limitations on the
holding, noting in his dissent that the reasoning of the majority left
34
state same-sex marriage bans “on pretty shaky grounds.”
Despite Justice Kennedy’s disclaimer and the limited nature of the
Lawrence holding, the decision had a serious impact on the movement
for equal marriage rights. For the first time, the same-sex marriage
35
debate received sustained mainstream media attention. This spike
in coverage of same-sex marriage was accompanied by a short-term
backlash evidenced in public opinion data, as approval of same-sex
marriage fell from 38% to 30% of the United States population in the
36
months following the ruling.

29
30
31

32
33
34

35

36

KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 77–79, 83; PINELLO, supra note 16, at 188.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624, 634 (1996).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 195–96 (1986), which held that due process did not protect any right of individuals
to engage in sodomy, regardless of whether it took place in the privacy of one’s own
home).
Id. at 578.
Dorf & Tarrow, supra note 22, at 455.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining that the reasoning in Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence “leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples”); see also id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This case ‘does not involve’ the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle
and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court.”).
Nathaniel Persily et al., Gay Marriage, Public Opinion and the Courts 18, 20–23, (Penn Law
Faculty Scholarship, Paper No. 91, 2006), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/
faculty_scholarship/91 (using polling data on approval of gay marriage collected by the
Pew Research Center and number of mentions of gay marriage in news media to show a
negative correlation between the two following the Lawrence decision).
Id. at 21. The authors also noted that such “short-term” backlash is highly unusual, theorizing that it arose here largely due to the combination of increased media coverage, raising the salience of a relatively new issue, and the statements made against same-sex mar-
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This decline continued in the aftermath of the next significant
same-sex marriage state court decision, which occurred later that
37
same year. In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared that its state constitution pro38
tected same-sex couples’ right to marry. Opponents of the ruling
failed to gather the necessary support for any constitutional amendment overturning the case at the subsequent constitutional conven39
tions. As a result, unlike its predecessor, Baehr, the Massachusetts
40
holding led to the first actual same-sex marriages in the country.
The increased media attention to same-sex marriage continued into
2004, as San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom unilaterally distributed
over 4000 marriage licenses to same-sex couples, despite California’s
2000 marriage statute that defined marriage as “between a man and a
41
woman.” In the aftermath of the Newsom affair, the California Supreme Court invited a constitutional challenge to the 2000 statute.
Thus, although San Francisco’s licenses were later invalidated, Newsom’s actions laid the groundwork for the 2006 case that would legal42
ize same-sex marriage in California.
These events on the state level brought same-sex marriage to the
forefront of national politics. In February of 2004, President George
W. Bush endorsed a constitutional amendment to protect traditional
43
44
marriage.
Though the amendment failed to gain traction, one

37
38
39

40
41

42

43

riage by political elites, who wouldn’t begin to come out in favor of marriage equality until 2006. Id. at 9, 25, 43.
Id. at 21.
798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
PINELLO, supra note 16, at 35, 56, 71. The opposition’s failure to pass an amendment was
not for lack of trying. In the 2004 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, a DOMA
amendment only failed to pass by a narrow margin before the majority, after days of debate, settled on an amendment allowing civil unions. This amendment required approval
the following year as well in order to be introduced to Massachusetts voters on the ballot;
however, after the 2004 elections yielded losses for same-sex marriage opponents and
corresponding gains for advocates, the civil union amendment failed by a landslide in the
2005 Constitutional Convention. Id.
Id. at 68–72.
Id. at 74 (discussing the distribution of marriage licenses during the period referred to in
the Bay Area as the “Winter of Love”); see also Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of
Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1172 (2009)
(describing how Newsom acted “unilaterally” in issuing marriage licenses to same-sex
couples during that time); Cal. Fam. Code § 308.5 (West 2000) (recognizing “only marriage between a man and a woman”).
Schacter, supra note 41, at 1172 (“The California Supreme Court ultimately invalidated
the Newsom-era marriages, but it left the door open for the constitutional challenge to
the California ban on same-sex marriage that was later filed.”) (citing Lockyer v. City of
San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 464, 494–95 (Cal. 2004)).
PINELLO, supra note 16, at 20 (explaining the proposed “Federal Marriage Amendment”).
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backlash scholar also credits President Bush’s electoral victory in the
2004 presidential race in large part to his stance against same-sex
45
marriage in the aftermath of Goodridge. Other commentators have
pointed out, however, that many issues—for instance, national security and terrorism—took a more central role in the election, and that
any gains President Bush experienced because of his stance on mar46
riage were modest at best.
Goodridge and the surrounding events did have their own fairly distinct national backlash, however. While there had only been three
states with constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage
prior to 2004, over the subsequent three years, twenty-six additional
states would pass constitutional amendments restricting marriage to
47
opposite sex couples only. Some of these amendments were also
48
worded strongly enough to block future civil union legislation.
Despite these effects, once the same-sex marriage debate again
found itself on the media backburner in 2006, favorable public opin49
ion recovered to its pre-Lawrence point and resumed its steady climb.
Moreover, public opinion toward civil unions improved dramatically
over this period, with a gain of almost ten percentage points in favor
of civil unions (and a corresponding decrease in those opposed)
50
from 2004 to 2006. This rise in favorable opinion corresponded to
an increase in legislation allowing civil unions, as thirteen states and
the District of Columbia had passed civil union or domestic partner51
ship laws by 2009.
Civil union laws did not prevent several states from eventually allowing full same-sex marriage rights in the coming years. Significant
litigation victories in Connecticut and California legalized same-sex
44
45
46

47
48
49
50

51

Id. (“The Federal Marriage Amendment failed by substantial margins in both houses of
Congress in 2004.”).
Michael Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 467
(2005).
See PINELLO, supra note 16, at 179–80 (examining survey data concerning the impact of
President George Bush’s stance against same-sex marriage on voters and finding that it
had “relatively modest” effects).
Schacter, supra note 41, at 1188–89.
Id.
Persily et al., supra note 35, at 21–23.
Id. at 40–41 (discussing the effects of different survey formats on public opinion regarding civil unions, concluding that civil unions became more popular during this period regardless of question wording, and explaining this increase by reference to political elites’
expression of approval for civil unions as a political compromise); see also PINELLO, supra
note 16, at 182 (“[F]ull civil unions with all the rights and responsibilities of marriage instantly became the political fallback position after the [Goodridge] ruling.”).
See Schacter, supra note 41, at 1189–90 (noting that of the thirteen states with civil union
or domestic partnership laws, only two “had acted under judicial compulsion”).
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52

marriage within those states in 2008, though the California case was
overturned shortly thereafter when the state passed Proposition 8, re53
stricting marriage to one man and one woman by popular vote. In
2009, an Iowa Supreme Court decision, Varnum v. Brien, legalized
same-sex marriage, and several other states began guaranteeing equal
54
marriage rights via statutes, as public opinion favoring marriage
55
equality continued to climb. Indeed, by 2011, Maine, Vermont, New
Hampshire, New York, and the District of Columbia had passed legis56
lation conferring full marriage rights upon same-sex couples.
Localized backlash was also a consistent theme throughout this
period. In addition to Proposition 8 in California, a ballot initiative
overturned the Maine marriage-equality legislation, and Iowa voters
removed the judges from office who had voted in favor of same-sex
57
marriage in Varnum. Nevertheless, national public opinion continued to march toward wider endorsement of same-sex marriage, as a
2010 poll became the first to show a majority of the American public
58
in favor of same-sex marriage rights. A steady drumbeat of cases
promoting marriage equality also began to build in 2010, as federal
courts started issuing rulings weighing against DOMA’s constitution59
ality, and a district court in California invalidated Proposition 8 on

52

53

54
55

56
57
58

59

See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452–53 (Cal. 2008) (legalizing same-sex marriage
in California until an amendment to the state constitution was passed), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d
407, 412 (Conn. 2008) (legalizing same-sex marriage in Connecticut).
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; see also Schacter, supra note 41, at 1190–91 (characterizing Proposition 8 preparation as “pre-backlash” because it commenced before the In re Marriage
Cases decision even came out, and describing how “Proposition 8 went on to pass with
approximately 52% of the vote”) (internal citations omitted).
763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); see Dorf & Tarrow, Bedfellows, supra note 22, at 456 (in 2009,
“same same-sex marriage was made legal by legislation” in Maine and Vermont).
Schacter, supra note 41, at 1194 (“Moreover, public support for same-sex marriage appeared to increase noticeably in 2009 . . . . [S]everal polls registered new levels of support.”).
Dorf & Tarrow, Bedfellows, supra note 22, at 456.
Id.
Opinion
Research
Poll
at
3,
CNN,
(Aug.
11,
2010),
http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2010/images/08/11/rel11a1a.pdf; see also FREEDOM TO
MARRY, CNN For the First Time, Poll Finds Majority Support for Freedom to Marry Nationwide
(Aug. 2010), http://www.freedomtomarry.org/blog/entry/for-the-first-time-poll-findsmajority-support-for-the-freedom-to-marry-nat (noting that the 2010 CNN poll was “the
first national poll to show that a majority of Americans support the freedom to marry”).
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health, 682 F.3d 1, 6 (1st. Cir. 2012) (noting
DOMA inhibits same-sex married couples from enjoying the full benefits of marriage,
such as being able to file joint federal tax returns); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt.,
824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012) appeal dismissed, 724 F.3d 1048, 1049–50 (9th
Cir. 2013) (holding DOMA, as applied to the plaintiff, was unconstitutional); Dragovich
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constitutional grounds—a ruling that would later be upheld by the
60
United States Supreme Court.
President Obama also showed the first signs of changing the executive stance on the same-sex marriage issue during this period, as
Attorney General Eric Holder sent a letter to Speaker of the House
John Boehner in early 2011 announcing that the administration
61
would no longer defend the constitutionality of DOMA. The administration’s new position fueled the increasing number of federal
62
President
cases taking issue with DOMA’s constitutionality.
Obama’s views on marriage equality completed their “evolution” in
2012, as the President came out in favor of same-sex marriage before
63
winning re-election.
The following year yielded unprecedented gains for marriageequality advocates. In 2013, six more states legalized same-sex mar64
riage. Additionally, the Supreme Court again issued rulings that
weighed in on the same-sex marriage debate, although the majority
continued to refuse to directly answer whether the Constitution safe65
guarded any right to same-sex marriage. Issuing twin opinions, the
Supreme Court refused to overturn a California district court’s invalidation of Proposition 8 in Hollingsworth v. Perry, and declared key

60

61

62
63

64

65

v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s lawsuit challenging DOMA).
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (invalidating Proposition 8 for “unconstitutionally burden[ing] the exercise of the fundamental right to marry
and creat[ing] an irrational classification on the basis of sexual orientation”), aff’d, 591
F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652(2013); Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668 (vacating the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance due to lack of standing, but leaving the district court’s judgment in effect).
Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House
of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorneygeneral-congress-litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act.
See supra note 59 (listing cases challenging DOMA’s constitutionality).
See Jackie Calmes & Peter Baker, Obama Says Same-Sex Marriage Should Be Legal, N.Y. TIMES
(May 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/us/politics/obama-says-same-sexmarriage-should-be-legal.html?_r=0 (describing the evolution of President Obama’s views,
culminating in his endorsement of same-sex marriage rights).
See Dorf & Tarrow, Bedfellows, supra note 22, at 456 (“On January 1, [2013,] same-sex marriage became legal in Maryland, as a result of changes approved in 2012. Rhode Island,
Delaware, Minnesota, Hawaii, and Illinois all followed with marriage equality statutes of
their own, although the Illinois law does not go into effect until the middle of 2014.”).
See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (vacating the Ninth Circuit’s
affirmance of a district court’s judgment invalidating Proposition 8 for lack of standing);
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683, 2695 (2013) (invalidating the portion of
DOMA that defines marriage as between one man and one woman on Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause grounds).
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portions of the federal Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional in
66
United States v. Windsor.
Though critics such as Justice Scalia attacked Justice Kennedy’s
67
majority opinion in Windsor for its lack of clarity, others have sug68
gested that the opinion’s ambiguity was intentional. The Supreme
Court’s progressive but gradual approach seemed to provide a clear
signal for lower courts to follow while allowing the Court to bide its
time, await a potential circuit split and let the positive trend in favorable public opinion toward same-sex marriage continue, enabling any
69
future marriage decision to better avoid backlash.
If there was an intentional signal, the lower courts seemed to have
no trouble catching on, as the trickle of decisions against DOMA’s
70
same-sex marriage ban grew into a cascade. In the two years between Windsor and Obergefell, there were four different circuit decisions and over forty district court decisions that were favorable to same71
sex marriage.
To put the movement’s progress in perspective, before Windsor a
total of nine states and the District of Columbia allowed same-sex
72
marriages. By the time the Supreme Court decided Obergefell, a total
73
of thirty-seven states already permitted same-sex marriages. Of the
twenty-eight additional states that found marriage equality between
the Supreme Court cases, five of them recognized same-sex marriage
through legislation (Illinois, Hawaii, Delaware, Minnesota, and
Rhode Island), while the other twenty-three granted same-sex mar74
riage rights through judicial decisions. One scholar described this
66
67
68
69

70
71

72

73
74

Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683, 2695.
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705–07 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s justifications behind its ruling as “rootless and shifting”).
Tom Watts, From Windsor to Obergefell: The Struggle for Marriage Equality Continued, 9
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S52, S56–58 (2015).
See id. at S58 (“If the outcome in Perry was an attempt by the Supreme Court to avoid
backlash . . . then Windsor was the corollary . . . . Windsor may have been written the way
that it was in order to create a circuit split on the state same-sex marriage bans, thus returning to the court the very issue that it deferred in Perry.”).
See id. at S64–65 (describing the “flood of favorable district court decisions” that occurred
post-Windsor).
Id. at S58–71. In contrast, there were only four federal cases that disfavored same-sex
marriage equality, including the Sixth Circuit case that created the circuit split and led
the Supreme Court to take Obergefell under advisement. Id.
See L.A. Times Staff, Timeline: Gay Marriage Chronology, L.A. TIMES (June 26, 2015) (tabulating legalization of same-sex marriage across the states, along with causes of legalization
between legislation and judicial order).
Julia Zorthian, These Are the States Where SCOTUS Just Legalized Same-Sex Marriage, TIME
(June 26, 2015), http://time.com/3937662/gay-marriage-supreme-court-states-legal/.
See, e.g., L.A. Times Staff, supra note 72 (providing an interactive map tracking legislation
and court decisions legalizing same-sex marriage across states leading up to Obergefell).
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period as “one of the most remarkable flurries of constitutional litiga75
During this period, favorable public
tion in American history.”
opinion toward marriage equality also continued its persistent climb,
moving from 54% to 60% of United States citizens approving of
same-sex marriage leading up to Obergefell, without any significant de76
cline in the immediate aftermath of the decision. The Supreme
Court’s strategy of moving alongside public opinion, neither falling
too far behind nor stretching too far ahead of it, seems to reflect institutional learning from previous landmark cases and, perhaps, the
scholarship surrounding backlash, which the next Part explores.
II. BACKLASH FRAMEWORKS
Backlash in the judicial context can be defined broadly as the
mobilization of political opposition against an adverse court ruling,
the effect of which is to undermine either the ruling’s implementa77
tion or subsequent policy goals of the victor. Examples of judicial
backlash include the passage of opposing legislation, the electoral
removal of politicians who endorsed the ruling, or even outright re78
sistance to the ruling’s execution. Though much work has examined backlash as a broad political phenomenon, this Part will focus
on the judicial context, exploring the frameworks of three prominent
scholars who have sought to explain and predict backlash specifically
in response to court decisions. Importantly, each of these scholars
has weighed in on the efficacy of the litigation strategy that marriage
79
equality advocates have pursued as well.
75
76

77

78

79

Watts, supra note 68, at S78.
McCarthy, supra note 14.
See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 388–89 (2007) (reviewing the developing understanding of
the term “backlash” and exploring how it has been applied to discussions of judicial decisions).
See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 1235, 1237 (2010) (defining the backlash thesis as “the proposition that litigation
does more harm than good for social change movements by producing countermobilization that makes reform goals more difficult to achieve”). Some scholars have convincingly argued that examining this topic from the perspective of judges and advocates causes
academics to miss key positive effects of backlash—namely, the popular constitutional dialogue that backlash inspires (and, to an extent, embodies). See Post & Siegel, supra note
77, at 373, 389–91. In addressing the more judiciary-focused backlash literature and arguing that litigants and judges perhaps should not be as fearful of backlash as the past
scholarship would indicate, the present study necessarily adopts a similarly court-focused
view. However, the idea of backlash as a useful tool to rouse popular constitutional dialogue is one to which I will return in Part IV.
See also Eskridge, supra note 21, at 311–12 (arguing that same-sex marriage litigation has
caused backlash, but concluding that the progress from litigation in this case has so far
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The work of the first scholar, Gerald N. Rosenberg, proposes that
courts, acting on their own, are a “hollow hope” for social movement
80
These constraints,
progress due to several structural constraints.
which delimit the judiciary’s efficacy as an agent of social change, include (1) the limited nature of constitutional rights, (2) the judicial
branch’s lack of independence from the influence of the other
branches, and (3) the judiciary’s inability to implement its own deci81
sions.
These limitations stymie the advancement of social movements that use litigation strategies by either guaranteeing loss or offsetting any judicial gains with the resulting countermobilization of
82
opponents. Rosenberg thus argues that, in the absence of an accompanying political movement, litigation will be counterproductive
83
to social movement goals.
Rosenberg released a critique of the same-sex marriage movement’s litigation strategy in 2008, applying his criteria to Baehr, Baker,
84
and Goodridge. Arguing that each decision more effectively mobilized opponents than advocates, he asserted that “the political insulation of the judiciary, the very attribute that allows the relatively disadvantaged to have their day in court, also limits the efficacy of judicial
85
victories.” Rosenberg ascribes the same-sex marriage backlash (and
backlash in general) to both a popular perception of courts as an anti-democratic institution and their greater tendency, in the absence of
86
direct political feedback, to flout public opinion in their rulings. He
concludes that the marriage-equality campaign would have been better off using its resources to pursue legislative change, or, if it insisted

80
81

82

83
84
85

86

outweighed the detriment). See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 339–415 (2d ed. 2008); KLARMAN, supra note 20,
at 63–68.
ROSENBERG, supra note 79, at 430.
Id. at 10–21. Rosenberg also discusses several conditions, at least one of which must be
present for courts to overcome the implementation constraint for a given social cause.
Id. at 30–35. However, they are inapplicable to the same-sex marriage debate, as the implementation constraint does not come into play. Id. at 350–51. They are therefore
omitted from this discussion.
See id. at 83–84 (discussing how civil rights lawyers, despite their victory in Brown, were
unable to overcome massive resistance to implementation of desegregation without the
Court’s assistance from other branches).
Id. at 428–29.
Id. at 343–54.
Id. at 417. Rosenberg elaborates further on this point, explaining that judges are more
likely to act in the absence of political support than other governmental actors, thus inspiring backlash, due to this lack of political accountability. Id. at 425–26.
Id. at 425–26.
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on litigation, proceeding more gradually, targeting civil unions be87
fore attempting to attain full marriage rights.
Legal historian Michael Klarman, whose backlash scholarship
could be described as the spiritual successor to Rosenberg’s “hollow
hope” thesis, had a much rosier assessment of the same-sex marriage
88
movement’s litigation strategy in his more recent evaluations. In his
earlier work, Klarman argued that court decisions “produce backlashes for three principal reasons: They raise the salience of an issue,
they incite anger over ‘outside interference’ or ‘judicial activism,’ and
they alter the order in which social change would otherwise have oc89
curred.”
Like Rosenberg’s explanation of backlash, Klarman’s
framework rests on two pillars: his first and third reasons imply that
judicial backlash arises because courts can more easily fall out of
touch with public opinion than their more politically accountable
90
governmental colleagues, while his second reason seems to attribute
backlash to a supposedly popular view of courts as external, non91
democratic intermeddlers. Klarman concludes that the Supreme
87
88

89
90

91

Id. at 417–19.
See KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 218–19 (arguing that public opinion trends make the
eventual legalization of same-sex marriage inevitable regardless of whether proponents
choose a litigation or legislation strategy, though the latter would lead to less backlash
along the way).
Klarman, supra note 45, at 473.
See id. at 474, 478–79 (noting, with regard to the salience point, that “Court rulings such
as Lawrence and Goodridge forced people who previously had not paid much attention to
gay-rights issues to notice what has been happening and to form an opinion on it,” and in
reference to the order of social change, that Goodridge inspired backlash because it mandated marriage equality at a time when American public opinion had only just warmed
up to civil unions and remained opposed to same-sex marriage).
See id. at 475 (“[B]ecause [Goodridge] was a court decision, rather than a reform adopted
by voters or popularly elected legislators, critics were able to deride it as the handiwork of
arrogant ‘activist judges’ defying the will of the people.”). Whether this characterization
of courts as “anti-democratic” serves as a mere rhetorical argument used by political
elites, or itself represents a source of backlash, is left unclear in Klarman’s work. In his
earlier assessment of same-sex marriage, Klarman seems to imply both, though scholars
evaluating his work have disagreed on this point. Compare Post & Siegel, supra note 78, at
392 n.91 (dismissing the implication in Klarman’s work that judicial activism is an inherent source of backlash because “Klarman makes no serious effort to argue that there
would be less backlash if Congress, rather than courts, were to have ended school desegregation or abolished the crime of sodomy, and the common sense of the matter is surely
to the contrary”) with David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash?
Evidence from a National Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 741–42, n.29 (2012) (contending that Klarman is making an argument about the popular perception of judicial
competency by presenting the rhetorical arguments against “judicial activism” as being
successful). In his more recent work, Klarman has stated, in reference to his assertion
that judicial decisions can outpace public opinion, thereby causing backlash, that “[t]he
point is not that court decisions generate greater backlash than identical legislative policy
resolutions would have, but rather that courts may issue unpopular decisions that legisla-
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Court “rarely, if ever” serves as “the vanguard of a social reform
movement” because it is too constrained by the threat of backlash to
92
significantly deviate from public opinion. It can, however, attain
symbolic victories by “constitutionaliz[ing] consensus and sup93
press[ing] outliers.”
Klarman’s more recent assessments of the same-sex marriage litigation strategy and its capacity to overcome or bypass backlash have
grown increasingly optimistic. In his 2013 book on the subject, Klarman described the legalization of same-sex marriage as inevitable and
predicted that it would most likely occur through a Supreme Court
94
ruling. Notably, as one reviewer points out, though Klarman uses
the same variables previously described to predict backlash, his tone
and conclusion have changed, reflecting more positive appraisals of
95
the efficacy of the marriage-equality movement’s litigation strategy.
While Klarman concluded in 2005 that same-sex marriage litigation
96
had hurt more than it had helped the movement, in 2013 he drew
97
the opposite conclusion. Nevertheless, Klarman cautioned that opposition to same-sex marriage remained strong and that how the
marriage-equality movement proceeded would affect the level of re98
sistance it encountered.

92
93

94
95

96

97
98

tures, confronting the same issue at the same time, would have avoided.” KLARMAN, supra
note 20, at 167–68.
Klarman, supra note 45, at 445.
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 453–54 (2004) [hereinafter “KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW
TO CIVIL RIGHTS”]; see also KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 207 (“Once public opinion has
shifted overwhelmingly in favor and many more states have enacted gay marriage, the
Court will constitutionalize the emerging consensus and suppress resisting outliers. That
is simply how constitutional law works in the United States.”); Klarman, supra note 45, at
450–51 (discussing various justices’ “strong sensitivity to public opinion”).
KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 202–07.
Jane S. Schacter, Making Sense of the Marriage Debate, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1193–94 (2013)
(reviewing KLARMAN, supra note 20). Klarman acknowledges that his thinking on the subject changed and developed between his works. KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 223.
Klarman, supra note 45, at 482. (“By outpacing public opinion on issues of social reform,
such rulings [like Goodridge and Lawrence] mobilize opponents, undercut moderates, and
retard the cause they purport to advance.”). It is important to note that Lawrence did not
outpace public opinion because it legalized homosexual sodomy, but because it was popularly associated with same-sex marriage, which was at the time largely unsupported. Id.
at 459; Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbianrights.aspx (tracking polling results across time and finding that approximately 40% of
respondents in 2003 supported same-sex marriage, while 60% opposed it).
KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 218 (“On balance, litigation has probably advanced the cause
of gay marriage more than it has retarded it.”).
Id. at 219.
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Most recently, in an interview after the Obergefell decision came
out, Klarman expressed doubt that there would be any serious back99
lash to the ruling. He argued that Obergefell will largely dodge backlash for four reasons: (1) it is congruent with public opinion toward
marriage equality, (2) it does not directly impact the lives of opponents, (3) the national Republican party has grown less likely to en100
dorse isolated resistance to same-sex marriage, and (4) circumvent101
This more recent backlash
ing implementation will be difficult.
iteration wisely discards any notion that resistance to judicial rulings
might arise from an inherent, popularly held view of courts as nondemocratic institutions; rather, it substantially relies on any given de102
cision’s congruence with public opinion.
Finally, prominent backlash author William Eskridge takes perhaps the least critical outlook on the same-sex marriage litigation
103
strategy.
His backlash framework distinguishes between (1) “normal politics,” which are the lowest stakes and involve consequentialist
assessments of proposed policies, (2) “identity politics,” which implicate “small ‘c’ constitutional issues,” or those that are especially relevant to our personal values, and (3) “the politics of disgust,” which
are the highest stakes and deal with issues that trigger highly nega104
tive, deeply rooted feelings like “disgust and contagion.”
99

100

101
102

103

104

Rick Shenkman, Why Liberals Shouldn’t Worry About a Backlash to the Same-Sex Marriage Ruling: An Interview with Harvard’s Michael Klarman, HISTORY NEWS NETWORK (July 3, 2015),
http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/159870 (quoting Professor Klarman’s argument
that “Obergefell probably will not elicit anything like the political backlash ignited by other
landmark Court rulings, such as Brown, Furman, and Roe”). Klarman also made a similar
prediction in an article after the release of his book but before the decision. See Michael
Klarman, A Gay Marriage Backlash? Not Likely, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/24/opinion/la-oe-klarman-scotus-and-gaymarriage-20130324 (“[W]hile a broad marriage equality ruling would undoubtedly generate some backlash, its scope would be far less than that ignited by Brown or Roe.”).
Klarman seems to use this point to argue that Obergefell will manage to avoid resistance in
the Deep South, despite pockets of less-than-favorable public opinion, presumably by
guaranteeing that defiant actions on the part of local leaders will be largely unsupported
by the broader party, and thus too politically costly in the long-term to pursue. See
Shenkman, supra note 99.
Id.
Though Klarman’s preceding set of factors seems to present several independent sources
of backlash, I argue that they cannot be separated from one another so neatly. Contrary
to what such lists of discrete factors imply, it simply is not possible to sever any of these
factors from Klarman’s first factor, as a decision’s congruence with public opinion is the
driving force underlying the potential backlash it will face. The remaining factors are
simply more nuanced, highly specific approaches to the first. See infra Part III.
See generally Eskridge, supra note 21, at 309–23 (listing several positive effects of the samesex marriage litigation strategy for the movement, while nevertheless cautioning courts to
proceed incrementally).
Id. at 292–94.
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Like Klarman’s most recent framework, Eskridge’s concept of
backlash attributes resistance, at a base level, to a decision’s incompatibility with public opinion, though Eskridge puts more emphasis
on the strength of opinions across the population than previously explored approaches. Whereas the stakes are low and the potential for
backlash is absent in normal politics, the higher the political stakes
surrounding a policy issue (moving from identity politics to the politics of disgust) the more intense and harmful to the policy the potential backlash will be, regardless of the institution taking action on the
105
issue.
Courts are the most likely institution to inspire backlash
simply because of their propensity to issue holdings that settle a matter for one side and against another, rather than reaching the type of
106
political compromise usually sought by legislators. Such final decisions, especially with regard to newly emerging, divisive political
groups, heighten political stakes, inspiring politics of disgust by mak107
ing the losing side feel alienated from politics.
Thus, while
Eskridge applauds the marriage-equality litigation movement’s progress, he cautions against litigation decisions that declare a clear winner, instead calling for a more incremental jurisprudence that lowers
108
the stakes of politics to avoid harmful backlash.
III. OBERGEFELL’S BACKLASH
Those who are anxious about backlash have little to fear from the
Court’s holding in Obergefell v. Hodges. Though it was an historic ruling that is already being characterized as the Brown v. Board of Educa109
tion of the marriage-equality movement, the backlash literature indicates that, unlike Brown, Obergefell will not face massive resistance.
This Part will draw from common themes throughout the previously

105

106

107
108
109

Id. at 279. Eskridge’s attempt to distinguish more harmful forms of backlash from less
harmful forms (i.e. those associated with “the politics of disgust” and “identity politics,”
respectively) seems to be, at least in part, directed toward circumventing Post and Siegel’s
critique of Eskridge’s former work as being too juricentric, and thus discounting backlash’s capacity to facilitate productive constitutional dialogue. See Post & Siegel, supra
note 78, at 396–401. Whether he accurately assesses the propensity of backlash to be so
harmful that it undermines constitutional dialogue is a compelling question, and one
that merits further exploration elsewhere.
Eskridge, supra note 21, at 279 (“Although judicially recognized equality is not always
more divisive than legislatively recognized equality, there is a particular danger that judges will move too fast in response to legitimate demands by the despised minority.”).
Id. at 292–96.
Id. at 321–22.
Corydon Ireland, Christina Pazzanese & Alvin Powell, One for the Ages, HARV. GAZETTE
(June 26, 2015), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2015/06/one-for-the-ages/.
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examined backlash scholarship to explain why a large-scale backlash
is unlikely. As the previous Part revealed, two common strands of
reasoning used to explain backlash wind throughout the literature:
the public opinion strand and the democratic legitimacy strand. This
Part will briefly explore each strand, concluding with an analysis of
how they affect the predicted backlash post-Obergefell.
A. The Public Opinion Strand
The first theme throughout the literature, which I refer to as “the
public opinion strand,” attributes backlash to the judicial tendency,
due to greater insulation from political accountability than the other
branches, to make decisions that stretch too far afield of public opinion, thereby inspiring popular resistance. Though this strand is the
most salient and nuanced in the backlash theories of Klarman and
Eskridge, it is prevalent throughout all of the literature. At the risk of
being overly reductive, this factor does most of the analytical legwork
in each of the backlash theories previously discussed.
To illustrate, though Klarman’s latest set of backlash factors seems
to present several independent sources of potential backlash, each
factor is inseparable from, and in fact functions through, his first fac110
tor—public opinion.
For example, Klarman’s treatment of his second factor, “direct impact on the lives of opponents,” has more to
do with the strength of public opinion on the policy-opposing side
than actual policy impact. While there is no doubt, as Klarman argues, that Brown had a direct, tangible effect on many Southern
whites by attempting to desegregate schools that their children at111
tended, it is much harder to make the same claim for Roe. Yet
Klarman claims that Roe directly affected opponents because they
112
“regard [abortion] as murder.” This sounds like an appraisal of the
strength of opinion among the opposition, rather than a tangible direct effect on them. To put it another way, nobody is forcing prolifers or their relatives to obtain or endorse abortions. Thus, Roe had
no direct effects on abortion opponents in the sense that Brown directly affected the lives of segregationists with school-aged children. Ra110

111
112

See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. Most recently, Klarman argued that Obergefell will largely dodge backlash for four reasons: (1) it is congruent with public opinion
toward marriage equality, (2) it does not directly impact the lives of opponents, (3) the
national Republican party has grown less likely to endorse isolated resistance to same-sex
marriage, and (4) circumventing implementation will be difficult. Shenkman, supra note
99.
Shenkman, supra note 99.
Id.
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ther, Roe had a perceived effect on opponents because of the strength
of their conviction that “abortion is murder.” In the same vein, Brown
could also be explained by reference to the perceived effect rather
than (or, in addition to) the direct one. Thus, one might more simply describe the “direct effect” factor as a more nuanced look at a sin113
gle aspect of public opinion.
Likewise, Klarman’s third factor, in this case the national Republican Party’s decreased likelihood to endorse isolated resistance to
same-sex marriage, has a fairly clear relationship with national public
opinion. Where the national party establishment recognizes a losing
battle in the public opinion realm, it will be reluctant to pour resources into isolated political clashes against the nationally favored
114
policy, even where the policy is highly disfavored on the local level.
Thus, the party establishment support factor can also be described as
a more specific public opinion inquiry.
Finally, contrary to what Klarman’s fourth factor implies, the ca115
pacity to circumvent implementation, like his other factors, is simply a function of whether and to what degree the decision contravenes
public opinion. Specifically, those in positions of power will only refuse to implement decisions where there is sufficient popular support
for doing so. This is true for both technical and direct noncompliance, though the relative political costs of each may call for a
higher degree of policy-opposing public opinion for a politician to
choose the latter. Nevertheless, it is hard to conceive of any public
policy where difficulty associated with resisting implementation
would foreclose popularly supported resistance to such implementation without envisioning a radically different government structure
than what the United States currently has. Therefore, like the “direct
effect” element, Klarman’s implementation factor, though nuanced,
can be simplified as a derivative of the backlash predictor that really
does the analytical heavy lifting: public opinion.
B. The Democratic Legitimacy Strand
The second theme, which I refer to as “the democratic legitimacy
strand,” explains judicial backlash as a product of a supposedly popular perception of courts as lacking democratic legitimacy (and therefore also the authority to issue far-reaching policies that ought to
113
114
115

Klarman has acknowledged the role of strength of public opinion elsewhere.
KLARMAN, supra note 88, at 172–74.
See Shenkman, supra note 99; see also supra note 100 and accompanying text.
Shenkman, supra note 99.

See
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have been deliberated on by politically accountable legislators). This
116
view is present primarily in Rosenberg’s work, though it also lingers
117
in the background of Klarman’s older backlash theory, and it re118
mains a favorite theme of dissenting justices.
Standing in stark contrast to the public opinion strand within the
literature, the democratic legitimacy strand has been largely abandoned by the most recent treatments of backlash, and for good reason. The idea that controversial political decisions should be enacted
through popular will, rather than at the whim of appointed judges,
has intuitive appeal. Yet this outlook is at odds with a substantial
body of literature arguing that people actually prefer courts to decide
119
major constitutional issues over other governmental bodies.
Moreover, though the concept of a democratic institutional preference is enticing to American sensibilities, common sense endorses
the simpler conclusion that people care less about the source of a
120
governmental decision than its substance.
A recent empirical examination bolsters this premise, finding that people will disapprove
of decisions they disagree with from a policy perspective and agree
with those that match their personal views, regardless of whether the
121
decision comes from the judiciary or the legislature.
Put another
way, just as “judicial activism flouts the popular will” offers an attractive narrative, so too does “legislature gets it wrong due to partisan
stalemate.” The narrative one endorses will be driven not by beliefs
regarding the institution, but rather by personal views on the decision
122
which that institution reached.
This is true for people on both
123
sides of the aisle. Thus, while “judicial activism” provides an attractive rhetorical attack on court decisions that one finds adverse, there
is no evidence to suggest that it achieves any real backlash effect on
124
its own.
Cries of “judicial activism” are a symptom, rather than a
cause, of backlash. The people who subscribe to the “judicial activ116
117
118
119
120
121

122
123
124

See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra note 9 and accompanying text (collecting portions of Obergefell dissents that
echo the democratic legitimacy theme).
See Fontana & Braman, supra note 91, at 739–40 (listing literature in support of pro-Court
institutional preference).
See Post & Siegel, supra note 78, at n.91 (opining that “the common sense of the matter is
surely to the contrary” regarding the democratic legitimacy backlash rationale).
Fontana & Braman, supra note 91, at 758–61 (explaining that experimental results show
that “beliefs about the competence of the institutions themselves are contingent, in significant part, on whether the institution delivers an outcome that a subject favors”).
Id. at 758.
Id. at 760.
Id. at 741, 766, 789.
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ism” argument do so because they already disagree with the opinion’s
substance, not because of strong preexisting attitudes toward the judicial institution.
Applying this insight to Obergefell, despite the grave warnings of
the dissenting justices, the Court’s decision to “[steal] this issue from
the people” will not “cast a cloud over same-sex marriage” that is any
different from the cloud that would have been cast had the legisla125
ture made the same decision. The institution making the decision
does not create the storm cloud; the substance of the decision does.
The institution simply affects the cloud’s location, whether that be
over the Supreme Court, the Capitol Building, or the White House.
126
For same-sex marriage opponents, the “dramatic social change”
arising from this policy would have been difficult to accept, regardless
of its source.
C. Public Opinion and Obergefell
The democratic legitimacy strand’s fall from favor does not mean
that courts do not offer a unique source of backlash. As the first
strand from the literature provides, judicial backlash does not arise
from public opinion rejecting the court, but rather from the court rejecting public opinion. To be clear, courts do not typically reject
public opinion intentionally; however, because judges tend to be the
least politically accountable officeholders, they have the lowest incen127
tive to stay up to speed. Even more importantly, institutional orientation and demographic skewing make judges highly likely to hold
128
views that differ from those of the general population.
Does it follow that the judiciary is always doomed to incur backlash when it rules on issues about which there are strong public opin129
ions? Clearly not. Where a court makes an effort to stay sensitive to
125
126
127

128

129

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
KLARMAN, supra note 20, at 169–70. Klarman notes that this holds true not only for appointed judges, but also for elected judges (though to a lesser extent), because they
“stand for reelection less frequently than do legislators.” Id. at 169.
Id. at 170 (noting that judges are members of the educational, socioeconomic, and legal
elite, predisposing them to have more liberal views, especially “on issues such as gender
equality and gay equality”); id. at 171 (“Judges may advance beyond public opinion on issues such as gay marriage . . .[in part] because they function within an institution that
operates according to different norms than the political system does.”).
The question is posed in this manner to acknowledge that the vast majority of court decisions (even from the Supreme Court) do not touch upon subjects about which the American public has taken positions, as these decisions usually have few or no effects that
reach beyond resolving the adjudicated conflict (especially in the case of lower courts),
and even when the rulings do have policy implications, they are often limited to specific
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public attitudes, it can choose to issue decisions that will not incur
significant backlash. Indeed, the Supreme Court rarely departs far
130
from public opinion, though where it has, the most memorable
131
cases of backlash in American history have followed. Thus, the Supreme Court has good reason to tread lightly when dealing with sensitive public opinion issues.
This is probably why its handling of Obergefell has been so careful.
132
With Roe v. Wade in the rear-view mirror, the Court chose to pursue
133
“a jurisprudence of minimalist incrementalism,” issuing decisions
that advanced the cause of marriage equality steadily, without getting
134
too far ahead of public opinion. Thus, when Obergefell was decided,
approximately 60% of the American public fell in favor of same-sex
135
marriage. Moreover, the intensity of public opinion favoring samesex marriage had grown to match and even exceed the strength of
136
beliefs held by the opposition. This level of current support, com-

130
131
132

133
134

135

136

contexts (e.g. court procedural rules). See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard
Cordray, Setting the Social Agenda: Deciding to Review High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court,
57 U. KAN. L. REV. 313, 323–24 (2009) (examining the Supreme Court’s 1983–1993 terms
and concluding, using a variety of measures, that an average of only fifteen cases per term
fell within the “high-profile” category).
See KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 449 (“The justices reflect
dominant public opinion too much for them to protect truly oppressed groups.”).
See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 78 (discussing various backlash approaches used to
explain popular resistance to Roe and Brown).
See, e.g., Jonathan Bullington, Justice Ginsburg: Roe v. Wade Not ‘Woman-Centered”, CHI.
TRIB. (May 11, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-11/news/chi-justiceginsburg-roe-v-wade-not-womancentered-20130511_1_roe-v-abortion-related-cases-wadecase (reporting on Justice Ginsburg’s worries that the Supreme Court moved too fast with
Roe, inciting major backlash); see also Greg Stohr & Matthew Winkler, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Thinks Americans Are Ready for Gay Marriage, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 12, 2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-12/ginsburg-says-u-s-ready-to-acceptruling-approving-gay-marriage-i61z6gq2 (describing Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, before
the Obergefell ruling, that it “‘would not take a large adjustment’ for Americans should the
justices say that gay marriage is a constitutional right”).
Nan D. Hunter, A Deer in the Headlights: The Supreme Court, LGBT Rights, and Equal Protection, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1121, 1131 (2015).
See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (refusing to rule on same-sex marriage
but leaving it legal in California); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (declaring DOMA unconstitutional); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (declaring sodomy laws unconstitutional).
See McCarthy, supra note 14 (demonstrating that public opinion in support of gay marriage remained stable after Obergefell, thus implying that the decision did not outpace
public opinion on the issue).
See Gary Langer, Support for Gay Marriage Reaches Record High, ABC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2015,
7:18 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/support-gay-marriage-reaches-record-high/
story?id=30507803 (“‘[S]trong’ support for allowing gay marriage exceeds strong opposition by 15 percentage points . . . . In a similar question in 2004, by contrast, strong opposition exceeded strong support by 34 points.”).
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bined with the continual positive trend in public attitude toward marriage equality, means that Obergefell will incite little or no backlash.
While this is a simple conclusion, it fulfills the many nuanced factors employed in the literature. Excluding predictors based in notions of democratic legitimacy backlash, under Rosenberg’s rudimen137
tary backlash analysis, the Supreme Court has avoided massive
backlash by keeping its decisions in line with public opinion. Like138
wise, under Klarman’s former analysis, backlash will be avoided because (1) the decision is congruent with public opinion, (2) salience
is already high on the issue, and (3) the Court, by proceeding incrementally, has avoided drastically changing the order of social reform.
139
Using Klarman’s more recent analysis, favorable public opinion ensures that avoiding implementation, no matter how easy this might
be, will not be politically expedient, especially because the public
opinion trend essentially guarantees that resistors will not get party
support on the national level. Without party support of resistance,
which arises from public opinion endorsing such resistance, significant backlash will not even occur in geographically isolated locations
with majority opposition to marriage equality. Finally, under
140
Eskridge’s framework, by pursuing incremental progress toward
marriage equality rather than declaring a winner when the issue first
appeared in front of the Justices in 2013, the Supreme Court allowed
the positive growth in public views on same-sex marriage to continue.
The Supreme Court not only lowered the stakes with its Windsor ruling, but also signaled to lower courts how to proceed on the question,
allowing the issue to advance at its own pace, district by district and
state by state, diffusing any would-be backlash.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing analysis poses two important questions with regard
to the efficacy of pursuing social change through litigation. First, if
the Supreme Court must track public opinion to avoid backlash,
doesn’t that interfere with its duty to vindicate constitutional rights?
The short answer to this question is: not necessarily. The legacy of
same-sex marriage litigation, especially between Windsor and Obergefell, illustrates how the judiciary can aggressively pursue a policy
agenda without clashing with public opinion at the Supreme Court
137
138
139
140

See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text.
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level. Though Windsor advanced the marriage-equality cause directly
by invalidating DOMA, it also facilitated progress indirectly by signaling the Supreme Court’s policy preferences to lower courts, triggering a cascade of favorable precedent that significantly advanced the
141
cause by the time Obergefell emerged two years later.
Thus, to use
Klarman’s words, in Obergefell the Supreme Court once again “consti142
tutionalized consensus and suppressed outliers.” This time, however, it was the judiciary that helped create the consensus in the first
place, with lower courts legalizing marriage in twenty-two states be143
tween Windsor and Obergefell.
This highlights the potentially important role of state and district
courts in facilitating social movement progress. Though Baehr led to
a massive backlash that, at the time, seemed to hurt more than help
the same-sex marriage cause, it also moved a previously radical idea
into the realm of possibility, influencing the movement’s entire
agenda and setting into motion a sequence of events that would par144
allel steadily increasing positive attitudes toward same-sex marriage.
“Put simply, there is little reason to believe people would have been
talking about, thinking about, or warming up to same-sex marriage
this much or this quickly had the court decisions not so dramatically
put the issue on the public radar screen and begun a public dia145
logue.”
Cases like Baehr and Goodridge, along with the many lower court
cases between Windsor and Obergefell, also give credence to the idea
that not all backlash is bad backlash. Previous literature has recog146
nized the utility of backlash for facilitating constitutional dialogue,
yet this dialogue can also be beneficial from a juricentric perspective.
In other words, backlash can not only benefit constitutional legitimacy generally by involving the public in a constitutional dialogue, it can
also benefit the specific aims of a litigation campaign. For instance,
where backlash raises the salience of a previously unfamiliar issue,
causing the public to form opinions, it can contribute to the long147
term progress of a social movement.
Because of courts’ rightsprotection orientation, they will often represent an emerging group’s
best chance at governmental and public recognition, in a sense forc-
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See Watts, supra note 68, at S74–S77.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
Eskridge, supra note 21, at 310–11; see also supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
Schacter, supra note 41, at 1220.
Post & Siegel, supra note 78, at 398.
Eskridge, supra note 21, at 311.
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ing governmental institutions and the public in general to
acknowledge, rather than ignore, the emerging group, even when the
group starts out on the fringes of society.
The discussion from Part III poses an additional question: if the
Supreme Court is bound by public opinion, will it ever be more effective than legislatures at creating social change? The answer to this is
an unequivocal yes. The scope of action defined by public opinion
acts as a restraint on all political branches: get too far behind public
opinion and risk irrelevancy, but get too far ahead and face the specter of backlash. Not all branches are equally constrained within this
zone of action, however. Though the branches will often mirror each
other, an adept Supreme Court can act more quickly than a legislature within this public opinion window.
Even where public opinion favoring a policy exists at a sufficient
level to render backlash unlikely, national politics and legislator concerns about outlying constituencies can operate to slow the legislative
148
process.
The Supreme Court does not share these constraints.
Though political leaders of outlier districts have little motivation to
work toward an unpopular policy in the legislature, neither do they
have a sufficient political incentive to fight a court ruling imposing
the policy when they will be unsupported on the national level. It is
much easier to reluctantly accede to the Supreme Court’s ruling, as
many state leaders did in the wake of Obergefell, than to independently
149
fight a losing political battle. Thus, the same weakness of the Court
that arises from its lack of direct political accountability can serve as
the strength of a more aware Court that keeps its finger on the pulse
of public opinion.

148

149

This is by no means an exhaustive list of potential legislative hindrances. See, e.g., Steven
Hill & Robert Richie, Why America Can’t Pass Gun Control, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 20, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/12/why-america-cant-pass-guncontrol/266417/ (asserting that gun control measures do not gain traction in Congress
largely because of the influence the NRA holds with a small number of constituents located in swing congressional districts); Sarah Binder, How Political Polarization Creates
Stalemate and Undermines Lawmaking, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Jan. 13, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/13/how-politicalpolarization-creates-stalemate-and-undermines-lawmaking/ (emphasizing the role of political polarization in creating deadlock within Congress); Aaron Belkin, Filibuster Reform
Will Result in a More Responsive Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/11/22/a-change-in-rules-on-filibustersand-its-impact-on-congress/filibuster-reform-will-result-in-a-more-responsive-congress (describing how the partisan use of “the filibuster has allowed minority factions to block policies that public majorities support” and how “filibusters have frozen federal policies”).
See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
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Despite possessing the potential to act as a catalyst for social
change, the Supreme Court takes a substantial risk whenever it does
so. If it misjudges public opinion, it may take an action that attracts
serious backlash. However, by acting too slowly, the Court may allow
ongoing constitutional violations, assuming the Court sees the issue
as such. These violations will often be a necessary cost of moving at a
speed that does not incur backlash, allowing the Court to take care
and perhaps pursue a minimalist jurisprudence that allows lower
courts to take the lead role in forging forward and cultivating public
support, as was done here. While the actions of the lower courts
serve to mitigate such constitutional violations, the Supreme Court
nevertheless has an incentive to decide the case as soon as the prudent desire to avoid backlash allows, vindicating the constitutional
rights of all citizens—even those in places where lower courts refuse
to push the ball forward. Thus, where the Supreme Court wishes to
usher in social change, it has the difficult job of balancing between
the political reality of backlash and the judicial duty to vindicate constitutional rights. For Obergefell, time will show not only that the Court
acted within this public opinion window, but also that it influenced
the size of the window by indirectly pushing its policy aims through
lower courts, allowing them to lead the charge and diffuse future
backlash.
CONCLUSION
The Obergefell legacy has much to teach backlash scholars, social
movement advocates, and the judiciary. For scholars, Obergefell cautions against categorical pronouncements regarding causes and effects of backlash. The analysis of backlash presented here seeks to
both focus the backlash causal inquiry and direct future scholarship
toward searching out the many nuanced contextual factors that influence public opinion in any given case.
Obergefell also poses to scholars the wider question of the degree to
which the actions of courts and litigators in the same-sex marriage
campaign can be useful in other contexts. Admittedly, the foregoing
analysis glosses over many of the somewhat unique social and political
150
trends underlying the movement toward marriage equality.
Though I contend that the developments that this analysis points out,
especially with regards to Supreme Court jurisprudential strategy, can
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See KLARMAN, supra note 20 (providing a nuanced, holistic treatment of the marriageequality movement that examines many of these trends).
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be carried over to other contexts, I leave open the question of the
conditions required—for example, the degree to which lower courts
must be sympathetic to the Supreme Court’s agenda—to facilitate the
use of such a strategy across circumstances.
For advocates, the Obergefell story suggests that, far from being a
“hollow hope,” the pursuit of a litigation campaign can bolster the
status of a social movement, both through favorable rulings and
through extrajudicial effects, for example raising the salience of previously unexamined issues. Though litigation runs the risk of causing
resistance, the backlash it inspires will not necessarily be detrimental
in the long term; litigation can still serve as the backbone of a highly
effective social movement as it did in the fight for marriage equality.
Finally, Obergefell shows that the judicial branch can act as a potent
facilitator of social change. Though the Supreme Court is constrained by public opinion, it is less constrained than the other
branches; moreover, it has the limited ability to circumvent this constraint by signaling its policy preferences to lower courts. Obergefell’s
largely peaceful aftermath will underscore these lessons, restoring the
hope of those who put faith in the judiciary’s ability to effectively advance the protection of constitutional rights, even where social
change is necessary to do so.

